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In this issue of Chicago-Kent Law Review we have asked several peo-
ple to comment on intellectual property from their own academic per-
spectives. Their responses developed along two themes-questioning the
nature of an author's claim and questioning the nature of the copier.
As the area of intellectual property grows and gains not only in aca-
demic interest but also in financial significance,I the conceptual justifica-
tion for the various systems of protecting the manifestations of ideas
becomes critical. This issue concentrates on proposed justifications of
the intellectual property legal regime as it is developing today and as
viewed from other perspectives than standard intellectual property
discourse.
We are delighted to bring together here the comments of several
philosophers, a philosopher economist, a practitioner fascinated by liter-
ary theory, and an artist. We have asked them to discuss intellectual
property law from the perspective of their given fields. None of the lead
authors are traditional intellectual property law scholars.2 Rather, we
selected individuals from other disciplines in order to institute a dialogue
between intellectual property people on the one hand and property theo-
rists and artists affected by intellectual property law on the other hand.
Our objective in starting this dialogue is to begin a cross-discipline
debate between intellectual property theorists and property theorists as
well as intellectual property practitioners and artists. Too often scholars
* Copyright © 1993 by Kenneth L. Port.
** Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. 1982, Macalester College; J.D. 1989, University of Wisconsin. The author would
like to express his appreciation to Wendy Gordon for her efforts in making this Symposium a reality
and for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this Foreword.
1. Some official estimates indicate that the U.S. economy loses almost $24 billion a year due to
intellectual property counterfeiters, resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs. Marshall A. Leaffer,
Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IoWA L.
REV. 273, 274 nn.7-8 (1991). See also Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade
and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANS.NAT'L L. 285, 286 (1989)
(loss to U.S. economy amounts to $40 billion).
2. But see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 n.9 (1985)
(citing Timothy J. Brennan and Wendy Gordon).
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from each of these fields conceptually exist within the confined space of
their own disciplines. In asking people from other fields to comment on
intellectual property, our objective is to inform intellectual property law
discourse with the insight of their perspective and thereby greatly enrich
intellectual property discourse.
In defining "intellectual property" as a term of art, there are two
levels of analysis. The first is the practical, specific level whereby intel-
lectual property is made up of three primary subfields-namely, patents,
copyrights, and trademarks. On this level, it is fundamental to recognize
that patents, copyrights, and trademarks are not interchangeable. Each
is intended to protect a very specific type of work with very distinct
methodologies of protection. Although there is some interplay regard-
ing, for example, whether an inventor/author is best served by claiming
copyrights to a computer program or obtaining a patent for the program,
each of these subfields has developed along distinct lines of analysis, dis-
course, and, most importantly, subject matter of protection.
On another more generalized level, intellectual property is the legal
regime by which authors or inventors protect their intellectual creations. 3
On this level, distinguishing with any particularity the conceptual differ-
ences between the subfields may not be necessary because each begins
with the same inquiry-who owns the creation and what is the scope of
those ownership rights. On this level, the analysis can begin with this
common starting point to determine if a proposed answer or model is
justified in differing circumstances within the various subfields.
At this level, as a general regime for protecting intellectual cre-
ations, the debate focuses on the theoretical justifications for protecting
these creations, the extent to which such protection is or is not justified,
and the actual and theoretical ramifications of the regime in general.
This Symposium issue engages intellectual property law more on the
second level of analysis rather than the first. Before comment is really
possible on the second more generalized level, however, an understand-
ing of the first level is necessary. Therefore, for the benefit of the non-
intellectual property specialist and/or future commentators on the sub-
ject matter, I establish below the generally accepted views of each of the
subfields as they exist at the first level. I present copyright law first and
in most detail because most of the contributors to this Symposium issue
3. Although trademarks are not considered creations as such, and certainly the creative ele-
ment is not what is protected in trademark law, trademarks are generally included in the larger
category of intellectual property. Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329,
1346 (C.D. Cal. 1989). See also Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 68:585
FOREWORD
focus on this subfield. However, because references are also made to pat-
ents and trademarks, I also summarize each of these subfields.
II. COPYRIGHTS4
Copyrights, like patents, exist with express constitutional authoriza-
tion. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution provides that copyrights
are to be granted "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries." s
The generally accepted purpose of copyright law is to grant protec-
tion to specific authors to encourage all authors to create and disseminate
their works. As a result, the public at large will have access to this infor-
mation.6 Without such protection, the law assumes that authors would
not create as much as they would with the protection; that without copy-
right protection ensuring exclusivity publishers would not publish as
much as they would with protection; and that without copyright protec-
tion authors would be more inclined to sit on their ideas and choose not
to make them public.
Copyright law generally protects works of original authorship that
are fixed or expressed in a tangible medium of expression.7 Copyright-
able subject matter includes literary works, musical works, dramatic
works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound
recordings, and architectural works.8
Copyright protection subsists from the moment of creation regard-
less of registration or notice formalities and continues for the life of the
author plus 50 years. 9 Copyrights in anonymous works, pseudonymous
4. This section focuses on copyright law according to the Copyright Act of 1976. Unless
otherwise indicated, general references to copyright law are to post-January 1, 1978 works (the
effective date of the 1976 Act).
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv.
Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1061 (1986). See generally
HOWARD B. ABRAMs, THE LAW OF CopymIrr (1991); MICHAEL A. EPsTEIN, MODERN INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY (1989); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
(1993).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1993).
8. Id.
9. Id § 302(a). Joint works-that is, works that were authored by more than one person-
last for life plus 50 years of the last surviving author. Id. § 301(b). For a discussion of the rationale
for extending protection from a maximum of 56 years under the prior 1909 Act to life plus 50 years,
see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 133-36 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,




works and "works made for hire"1 ° last for 75 years from the year of
publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expires first.1t
Copyright grants the author of the work the exclusive right to
reproduce the work, to prepare derivative works based upon the work, to
distribute copies of the work for public sale or transfer ownership, to
perform the work publicly, and to display the work publicly.12
There are three generally accepted limitations to the assertion of
copyrights. First, unlike patent law, copyright only grants the holder the
exclusive right to copy the protected work. True independent develop-
ment is a complete defense to an otherwise infringing act.13
Secondly, copyright only protects the expression of an idea and not
the underlying idea itself.14 This is generally referred to as the idea/
expression dichotomy. Although a never ending source of confusion by
the courts and analysis by commentators, the idea/expression doctrine's
purpose is to prevent monopolies in ideas and encourage expression and
publication of ideas.
Finally, copyright does not protect the underlying facts,15 systems,
processes, or methods1 6 described in the work. Therefore, if I write a
book regarding the Civil War, that expression in the form of the book
and the words I choose as well as the organization and design should be
copyrightable; however, the underlying facts upon which my book is
based are not protected and anyone may use those facts even if my re-
search to discover those facts was difficult and expensive.' 7 However, if I
compile mere facts in a telephone book, for example, as long as I add
some originality to that compilation, such as by organization or design,
the resulting work would most likely be copyrightable but only as to that
organization or design.' 8
10. A "work made for hire" is a work that was prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment or a commissioned work expressly stating that the work is a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The author of a work made for hire is the corporation or hiring party.
Therefore, the copyright to a work made for hire is owned by the corporation or hiring party unless
expressly provided for in writing to the contrary. Id § 201(b). For a fuller discussion of proprietary
interests in works made for hire, see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988).
12. Id § 106(1)-(5).
13. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., III S. Ct. 1282, 1287"(1991).
14. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879).
15. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
17. See Miller, 650 F.2d at 1368-70.
18. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (Mere compila-
tions of fact in the form of white pages listings in a telephone directory are not copyrightable without
some minimum level of creativity. Such a compilation with a minimum level of creativity is copy-
rightable but only to the extent of the creativity added.).
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Copyright litigation generally presents two issues. The first is the
copyrightability of the work. The second is whether the copyrighted
work was infringed. The infringement test is easy to state and difficult to
apply: Copyrighted work A is infringed by subsequent work B if the au-
thor of work B was actually or arguably exposed to A (that is, had "ac-
cess" to the work) and the resulting work B was substantially similar to
A.19 Substantial similarity has been defined by Learned Hand as whether
the ordinary observer would look at two works and, not focusing on any
dissimilarities, would overlook such dissimilarities and consider the two
works aesthetically the same.2
0
Whether a particular work constitutes copyrightable subject matter
is difficult to conceptualize and difficult to apply. Furthermore, the
range of appropriate copyrightable subject matter is forever expanding.21
Therefore, the parameters of copyrightability are extremely flexible. This
unpredictable nature of copyright law gives some courts as well as com-
mentators fits.
Therefore, below I state simply some of the underlying principles
regarding copyrightability.
1. Although copyright protection does not extend to underlying
ideas or facts themselves, if assembled or compiled with some
originality, that expression of originality is generally sufficient to
warrant copyright protection; however, it would only be pro-
tected to the extent contribution was original.22
2. Copyright protection is available only for the non-utilitarian as-
pect of a work. To the extent a work is useful, it is not
copyrightable. 23
3. Copyright law also protects derivative works24 even when the
underlying work is already in the public domain. If an author
contributes enough originality,25 that author's contribution will
19. Of course, the question of substantial similarity is a question of fact for the fact finder.
International Luggage Registry v. Avery Prod. Corp., 541 F.2d 830, 831 (9th Cir. 1976). As such, it
would be in the purview of the jury to find no substantial similarity.
20. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 484, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
21. See, eg., Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (defining the grant of
copyright protection for choreography as stated in 17 U.S.C § 102).
22. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1282.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) c. . .only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article"); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 308-13 (1954).
24. A derivative work is a work that is based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound re-
cording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed or adapted. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
25. What amounts to sufficient originality to establish copyright protection in derivative works
'1993]
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result in a protected derivative work.
4. The copyright act has no minimum level of aesthetics. 26 The
level of originality required for copyrightability is quite mini-
mal. Some define originality as merely not copying.27
5. Copyrights subsist from the moment the work is fixed in a tangi-
ble medium of expression.28 Nothing else need be done by an
author to have valid and existing copyrights in and to a work.
6. Registration of copyrights is necessary prior to litigation. 29
Timely registration is required to obtain statutory damages and




Patents also received their genesis in the Constitution. 3' However,
on the first level of analysis, patents and copyrights are conceptually
quite distinct. Whereas copyrights protect creative works of authorship
for a long duration of time, patents protect inventions of useful machines,
processes, or manufactures for a much shorter period of time-17 years
for most patents rather than life plus 50 years of the author for copy-
rights. Whereas copyrights subsist upon creation, patents only exist with
is a rather hotly debated issue. The court in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.),
cert, denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976), seemingly claimed that something more than the usual amount of
originality is necessary to grant protection in derivative works. IdL at 490. However, if the point of
copyright protection is to encourage authors to create, no conceptual justification exists to require
authors of derivative works to show more originality than any other author. The only justification,
of course, is that we value derivative works less than truly original works. Besides, copyright protec-
tion for derivative works only extends to the derivative work itself and does not impact the copyright
duration or status of the underlying work. Therefore, a play adaptation of A Connecticut Yankee in
King Arthur's Court is copyrightable to the extent it expresses original elements, scenes or words.
However, it is unsettled whether or not, for example, the newly reconstructed emendations of the
Dead Sea Scrolls are independently copyrightable. One court in Israel, however, has recently found
in favor of the copyrightability of the reconstructed emendations in Dead Sea Scrolls. See Asher F.
Landau, The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Recognized Rules of Copyright, THE JERUSALEM POST, April
11, 1993, Features.
26. See, e.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Obscenity is not a defense to copyright infringement.), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
27. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
29. If the Copyright Office refuses registration, the owner of a work can still file suit but he
must deposit copies of the work with the Library of Congress prior to instituting suit. At the time of
this writing, legislation is pending before the United States Congress that would abolish virtually all
registration requirements but maintain certain incentives. See Copyright Reform Act of 1993, S.
REP. No. 373, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); H.R. REP. No. 897, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
30. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, at 7, 102 Stat. 2853,
2858-59 (1988).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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express government recognition in the form of letters patent.3 2 Also,
whereas copyright law does not protect against independent creation or
development, patent law does. 33
The express purpose of granting greater rights to patentees than to
other owners of intellectual property is to encourage invention and
thereby benefit the development of the sciences. 34
Although various theories justifying the granting of the patent mo-
nopoly exist, the generally accepted version is referred to as the "incen-
tive theory." 35 According to the incentive theory, the patent monopoly
must be granted to inventors to compensate them for the time, money,
and energy they invest in the invention and to assure them any monetary
gain resulting from their invention.36
The other justification for granting a patent monopoly to an inven-
tor is more of a natural rights argument: an inventor should own title to
the creations of his/her mind. A statute cannot grant or deny rights in
one's own intellectual creations. Rather, an inventor has title in and to
these inventions regardless of any statutory monopoly. 37
Patent law protects novel, non-obvious, and useful inventions gener-
ally embodied in machines, processes, or chemicals. Patent rights do not
exist independent of the express government grant of letters patent. Un-
like copyright registration, patent registration is an expensive, time con-
suming task.38 Because the patent does not exist apart from the letters of
patent, it is of primary importance to "claim" as broad coverage as possi-
32. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1965); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376
U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
33. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 477 (1974).
34. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stifrel, 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
35. I am indebted to Timothy J. Shea, Jr., Chicago-Kent College of Law Class of 1995, for his
research and suggestions regarding these justifications of the patent system.
36. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECoN. 265,
266 (1977).
37. These are the two basic conceptual justifications generally given for the existence of the
patent monopoly-reward inventors or they won't invent vs. inventors already own title to their
creative endeavors. There are other economic justifications of the patent system of which the reader
should be aware. One is the "prospect theory." See Kitch, supra note 36. Kitch analogized his
theory to the old system for mineral claims (thus the name "prospect"). According to Kitch, the
patent is an award for early investment in the development process. After the patent is secured, the
patentee commences commercial development of the invention not unsimilar to how individuals
were encouraged and rewarded for prospecting for gold, etc. Another economic theory explaining
the patent monopoly is "rent dissipation." See Mark F. Grady & Jay L Alexander, Patent Law and
Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REv. 305 (1992). See also Donald Martin, Reducing Anticipated Re-
wards from Innovation through Patent. Or Less Is More, 78 VA. L. REv. 351 (1992). Pursuant to
this theory, a patent should only issue where the "size of the patent rent corresponds to the quality of
the signal for improvement." Grady & Alexander, supra, at 321.
38. Copyright registration is accomplished by filing one of the appropriate forms, including an
appropriate specimen of the works and including a S20 filing fee. It costs approximately $2,200 to
file, obtain, and maintain a patent for the patent term. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1988).
1993]
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ble. Many patentees have been greatly disappointed to have a minor
technical mistake or shortcoming in drafting the claims invalidate their
patent or preclude its enforcement. 39 Therefore, patent registration is the
first fundamental step in establishing patent rights.
The substantive requirements for a valid patent are as follows:





Statutory patentable subject matter includes "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof .... ."44 Although these parameters are
quite broad, this section of the Patent Act has been interpreted as not
allowing patents on laws of nature or physical phenomena like electro-
magnetism.45 Also, because of this statutory subject matter restriction,
mathematical formulae or algorithms for making mathematical compu-
tations are not appropriate patentable subject matter.46 That is, similar
to copyrights, patent protection is not available for an idea itself outside
of some embodiment of that idea.47
Inventions must also be useful before they are granted patents.48 In
practice, an invention need only be operable and capable of performing
some function (actually useful or not) to humanity in order to satisfy the
usefulness requirement.49 In reality, only those inventions that directly
conflict with known principles of physics or other sciences-such as a
perpetual motion machines or inventions that are unreasonably danger-
ous5l-fail the utility test.
Novelty is a slightly more difficult hurdle to pass. To determine if
an invention is novel, what is known as the "single source" rule applies.
39. See General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938); United Carbon
Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
41. Id §§ 101, 102.
42. Id § 101.
43. Id. § 103.
44. Id. § 101.
45. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
46. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); DONALD
S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2C[1][fl
(1992).
47. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966).
49. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 46, § 2C[2].
50. Id See, eg., Application of Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072 (C.C.P.A. 1969).




That is, if a single instance of prior art discloses each claimed element of
an invention, that invention is "unnovel"-"anticipated" in patent
jargon.52 For example, if the prior art discloses one single magazine arti-
cle that describes elements of a machine that processes hazardous waste
into biodegradable garbage, a subsequent patent application on that
machine by another would be invalid because it was anticipated.53
Most of the cases and literature in patents, however, deal with the
concept of nonobviousness. The nonobviousness doctrine developed as a
judicial construct to avoid granting a patent when public policy or other
less articulable reasons dictated against granting a monopoly for an in-
vention that otherwise satisfied the other statutory requirements.5 4
Specifically, the nonobviousness requirement prevents patents from
issuing when a person with ordinary skill in the art would have thought
the invention "obvious" on the day the invention was made.5 5 The gen-
eral test is derived from Graham v. John Deere Co. 56 There the Supreme
Court identified the practical test to determine whether an invention is
obvious along the following lines:
1. Identify the scope and content of the prior art;
2. Identify the difference between the prior art and the claims of
the invention;
3. Determine what is the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art;
and
4. Look to secondary considerations such as commercial success,
long felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others.5 7
With these technical requirements satisfied, only then can an inven-
tor obtain a patent for the invention. However, once a patent does issue,
the patentee is the exclusive owner of a comparatively strong monopoly.
For most patents the duration is only 17 years, and independent creation
52. Cmsms & JACOBS, supra note 46, § 2C[3]. See RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys.,
Inc. 730 F.2d 1440, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1228 (1984); see also Jamesbury
Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'd, 839 F.2d 1544, cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
53. See, eg., In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988). There the court rejected for obvi-
ousness the co-inventors' claim for controlling the expression of cloned genes where two of the three
co-inventors had published a paper on their work approximately two years prior to filing the patent
application. The court held this "prediction publication" to constitute prior art that made the appli-
cant's claim anticipated.
54. See generally Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement, and Obviousness." An Eternal
Golden Braid, 15 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 57 (1987); Kathleen N. McKereghan, Note, The Nonobviousness of
Inventions: In Search of a Functional Standard, 66 WASH. L. REv. 1061 (1991); Kevin Rhodes,
Comment, The Federal Circuit's Patent Nonobviousness Standards Theoretical Perspectives on Re-
cent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1051 (1991).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
56. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
57. Id. at 17-18.
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of the same invention is no defense to infringement. 58
IV. TRADEMARKS 5 9
Trademark law is completely distinct from both patents or copy-
rights. Whereas both patents and copyrights exist because of an express
constitutional grant,6° trademarks do not enjoy such recognition. In fact,
when confronted with the issue, the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressly held that the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution did
not envision protection of trademarks as well.
61
Rather than being based on the Patent and Copyright Clause, Con-
gress has the authority to regulate trademarks based on the Commerce
Clause. This is why interstate commerce or "use" of a trademark is cru-
cial for federal protection rather than simply its creation. 62 Trademark
protection is a common law concept that exists independent of any stat-
ute. In fact, the Lanham Act, the current trademark law, is said to be
only a registration statute codifying common law.
The Supreme Court has reasoned that trademarks do not "depend
upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires
no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. [Trademarks
are] simply founded on priority of appropriation."
63
58. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
59. See generally RULDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES (Louis Altman ed., 4th ed. 1981); JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRActiCE (1991); John F. Coverdale, Comment, Trademarks and Generic Wordx. An Effect-
on-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868 (1984). Portions of this section on trademarks appear
in Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REv. 519 (1993).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
61. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
62. With the 1988 amendments to the Lanham Act, a bona fide intention to use a mark will
protect it from infringing use if the mark ultimately is used. If the owner of an intent-to-use trade-
mark registration successfully enjoins an infringer but ultimately does not use the mark, the injunc-
tion would be dissolved. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988). See also Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
63. Trademark Cases 100 U.S. at 94. The Act of 1870 also contained an "intent-to-use" provi-
sion. The constitutional legitimacy of the intent to use portion of the Act was not clearly deter-
mined. The Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional because it was not based on the
Commerce Clause. In 1988, Congress amended the Lanham Act to include an intent-to-use provi-
sion allowing trademark holders to register their marks for three years if they had a bona fide inten-
tion to use them. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988). Because use of the mark in commerce is not required
and therefore no actual interstate commerce use occurs, the intent-to-use provisions should fail con-
stitutional review based on the Commerce Clause not unsimilar to the Trademark Cases. However,
several commentators have argued that the current intent-to-use provisions are constitutional be-
cause they are part of the "flow of commerce" notion and that the Supreme Court shows great
deference toward congressional power and Commerce Clause issues. See Charles J. Vinicombe, The
Constitutionality of an Intent to Use Amendment to the Lanham Act, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 361, 369-
73 (1988). See generally Frank Z. Hellwig, The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. The 100th
Congress Leaves its Mark, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 287 (1989).
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Trademark jurisprudence has developed over centuries of time. The
use of a mark to identify the source of a product actually began at least
3500 years ago when potters made scratchings on the bottom of their
creations to identify the sources. 64 The first judicial recognition of trade-
marks did not come, however, until 1618 in Southern v. How65 when an
English common pleas judge made an obscure reference to a mark used
on cloth. There are various renditions of how the subject of trademarks
arose in Southern v. How because the reference is actually to a prior unre-
ported case which denied trademark rights. 66 The notion of protecting a
commercially viable indication of source, therefore, had a rather dubious
beginning,67 but it soon became a well accepted judicial notion in Eng-
land that a mark deserved protection at common law to indicate source
or origin of goods.68
The American concept of trademark law followed this English com-
mon law notion.69 Today, the Lanham Act defines trademarks as any
64. See generally EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING
34-39 (1919); see also Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP.
551 (1969); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127 (1955); Abra-
ham S. Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks, 33 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y
876 (1951); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REv.
29 (1910). In addition, see GILSON, supra note 59, § 1.02[1]; WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 1-14 (1885). Browne traces the use of proprietary and trademarks
back several millennia to China, India, Persia, Egypt, Rome, and Greece, among other cultures, as
well as citing marks used during the time of the Old Testament. Id. at 8 (the blocks of stone used to
build the temple of Solomon bore quarry marks so the "mechanics" could "prov[e] their claims to
wages"), id. at 10 (Abraham paid for the cave in which he buried Sarah with coins bearing a mark of
authentication). "Seals and other emblems of ownership were coequal with the birth of traffic." Id.
at 2. "Such emblems had their origin in a general ignorance of reading the combinations of cabalis-
tic characters that we call writing." Id at 3. Browne discusses proprietary marks such as seals,
sign-boards, watermarks, quarry and pottery marks, currency, identifying marks on merchandise in
general, and books. Id at 3-14.
65. 79 Eng. Rep. 1244 (1618).
66. See generally FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RE-
LATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925); Kenneth R. Pierce, The Trademark Law Revision Act: Origins of
the Use Requirement and an Overview of the New Federal Trademark Law, 64 FLA. BJ., May 1990,
at 35.
67. See also Blanchard v. Hill, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (1742) (court refused to grant injunction
against alleged infringer because such injunction would give plaintiff a monopoly in sales of the
relevant product-playing cards).
68. In Sykes v. Sykes, 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (1824), the court regarded trademark protection as
well established and awarded an injunction to the plaintiff where the defendant had used the plain-
tiff's mark, SYKES PATENT, on inferior shot-belts and powder-flasks and passed them off as prod-
ucts of the plaintiff. Another case still relied upon today is Millington v. Fox, 40 Eng. Rep. 956
(1838), where plaintiff sued in equity to enjoin use of his mark. The court, in awarding the injunc-
tion, stated that the plaintiff had a right to enforce title to its mark and that an injunction was
appropriate even though there was no direct proof of defendant's intent to defraud and that defend-
ant may not have even known of plaintiff's mark. The United States Supreme Court has adopted
this case as controlling. See Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 179 U.S. 42 (1900). See also GILSON,
supra note 59, § 1.011].
69. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); Patricia K. Fletcher, Joint Registration of
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"word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof... used...
to indicate the source of the goods .. . ."70 Trademarks are generally
categorized into one of four groups: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and
arbitrary or fanciful. 71 The strongest mark is an arbitrary or fanciful
one72 such as KODAK 73 or EXXON.74 The weakest mark is a generic
mark75 such as cellophane76 or aspirin. 77 All marks fit somewhere on
this continuum, 78 although some courts have recognized that no clear
lines separate these categories.79 The assignment of a specific trademark
to one of these categories is not necessarily static. A mark can conceiva-
bly change status from one category to another based on the owner's use
of the mark and the degree of consumer recognition developed in the
mark.
Generic marks refer to the specific genus of which the particular
product is a species.80 In other words, generic marks are terms for which
Trademarks and the Economic Value of a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 297, 301-02
(1982).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). See also Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 945 (Fed.
Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Design Look Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
71. See generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir.
1976).
72. Clipper Cruise Line v. Star Clippers, Inc., 952 F.2d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir. 1992); Cellular
Sales, Inc. v. MacKay, 942 F.2d 483, 486 (8th Cir. 1991); General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824
F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1987).
73. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Wel, 243 N.Y.S. 319 (1930).
74. Exxon Corp. v. Xoil Energy Resources, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
75. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assn. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 855 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding "ifiwe hold a
designation generic, it is never protectable"); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc.,
684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heile-
man Brewing Co. 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). In fact, a
generic mark would not have trademark status at all.
76. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 601 (1936).
77. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that although the
trademark ASPIRIN started out as a strong, fanciful mark, use of the mark as the only English
language noun for the product caused it to become generic).
78. Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing
Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 79); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124
(4th Cir. 1990) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976)).
79. See Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 79 ("As the ease with which hues in the solar spectrum
may be classified on the basis of perception will depend upon where they fall in that spectrum, so it is
with a term on the trademark spectrum."); Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Laredo v. Union Nat'l Bank
of Texas, Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 846 (5th Cir. 1990) (" 'Although meant as pigeon-holes, these useful
labels are instead central tones in a spectrum,; they tend to merge at their edges and are frequently
difficult to apply.'" (quoting Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1980)); see
also Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
In re Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
80. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); Clipper Cruise Line
v. Star Clippers, Inc., 952 F.2d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir. 1992); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); Union Nat'l Bank, 909 F.2d at 845 ("A generic term is one




no other descriptive word exists in the English language. A mark be-
comes generic when it ceases to denote source and instead starts to de-
note the product itself.81 Famous examples of marks that have become
generic include "lite" for beer82 and "shredded wheat" for cereal.83 Ge-
neric marks are not registrable.84 The registrations for marks that be-
come generic may be canceled at any time.85 The test for determining
trademark genericism is whether the primary significance of the mark
identifies the producer 86 or the product.8 7 To the extent the primary sig-
nificance of the mark is to identify the product, the mark has become
generic.
The rationale for preventing trademark protection of generic marks
is simple. Allowing a monopoly on the use of a commonly used term
would be ludicrous. No individual should be able to appropriate existing
terms in the language for their own commercial advantage when to do so
would prevent competitors from using that term to describe their com-
peting products.88 When a trademark stops denoting the source of a
product but rather the product itself, it becomes the victim of genericide
81. Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 79-81.
82. Id.
83. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
84. For example, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held the mark ICE-PAK to be ge-
neric and therefore unregistrable. In re Stanbel, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1469, 1472 (T.T.A.B. 1990),
aff'd, 925 F.2d 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also Clipper Cruise Line, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1048 (finding
the term "CLIPPER" generic as applied to cruise ships).
85. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988); Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194. Although it is
fairly common for marks to evolve from distinctive to generic through improper usage by the owner
or genericide by competitors, some trademarks have moved from generic to distinctive. In 1896, the
Supreme Court held that the trademark SINGER had become the generic name for a sewing
machine. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). Singer continued to use their
mark and a half century later re-established it as a distinctive mark by establishing new secondary
meaning. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1953).
86. The customer need not know the actual producer just that the product came from a single
source. Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075
(1990); Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988); Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118.
88. See Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 964 F.2d 1338, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992). While finding the
plaintiff's mark ARTHRTICARE merely descriptive, the court stated "[o]ur conclusion is bol-
stered by the concern that 'exclusive use of the term might unfairly "monopolize" common speech'
S.. . According trademark protection to Arthriticare could forever preclude manufacturers of prod-
ucts marketed to arthritis sufferers from using the root of the word 'arthritic' for their products."
See also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918) ("The owner of a
trade-mark may not, like the proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibi-
tive use of it as a monopoly."); Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 1992)
("Generic terms are denied trademark protection because granting one firm their exclusive use
would place competitors at a serious competitive disadvantage.") (quoting GIIsoN, supra note 59,
§ 2.02); Hutchinson v. Essence Communications, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (re-
marking that "a trademark owner is not entitled to... pursue a course of action which, if successful,
'would be tantamount to awarding it exclusive dominion over a word in common usage,' with the




and ceases to function as an indication of source or origin.19
A descriptive mark only describes the good or service on which it is
used90 or an attribute of that good or service.91 In order to be registrable
and enforceable, the owner of a descriptive trademark must show that
the mark possesses "secondary meaning.' 92 If a descriptive mark lacks
secondary meaning, it is "merely descriptive" and therefore not registra-
ble and not enforceable.
93
Secondary meaning is the notion that if a word is used long enough
and enough money is spent promoting the mark, the consuming public
will eventually associate the word with the product.94 Thereby the word
will attain trademark status. The "secondary" meaning attained by a
word is that it functions not only as a word but also as a trademark-that
is, a source-indicating significance. 95
Suggestive trademarks are those marks which, although not arbi-
trary or fanciful, require some amount of imagination to determine what
89. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1321-26 (9th Cir.
1992); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80-81 (7th Cir. 1977), cerL
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
90. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 19 9);
Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1190 (6th Cir. 1988).
91. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); Bernard, 964 F.2d at
1341 ("a mark can be classified as descriptive if it conveys 'an immediate idea of some characteristic
or attribute of the product' ") (quoting Papercutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 562 (2d
Cit. 1990)); Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Laredo v. Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Austin, 909 F.2d 839,
845 (5th Cir. 1990) ("A descriptive term is one that 'identifies a characteristic or quality of the article
or service.' ") (citing Vision Center v. Optiks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1990)).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1988); Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194; Coach House Restaurant, Inc., v.
Coach & Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1559 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 182, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
93. Papercutter, 900 F.2d at 562; G. Heileman Brewing Co., 873 F.2d at 992; Blisscraft of
Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1961) ("[W]ords which are merely
descriptive of the qualities, ingredients or composition of an article cannot be appropriated as a
trademark and are not entitled to protection unless they'have acquired secondary meaning.").
94. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The basic
element of secondary meaning is, thus, the mental association by a substantial segment of consumers
and potential consumers 'between the alleged mark and a single source of the product' .... ")
(quoting I J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15:2, at 659 (2d
ed. 1984); id § 15:1 1(B), at 686); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 477
(5th Cir. 1974).
95. Dranoff-Perstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 858 (3d Cir. 1992) ("In order for secondary
meaning to exist, 'it is not necessary for the public to be aware of the name of the [source] .... It is
sufficient if the public is aware that the product [or service] comes from a single, though anonymous,
source.' ") (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 786 F. Supp. at 194 ("A mark has acquired
secondary meaning when it 'has been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference
to its article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has
come to mean that the article was the first producer's trademark.'") (quoting G. Heileman Brewing
Co., 676 F. Supp. at 1467).
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the association is between the trademark and the goods or services.96
Suggestive marks therefore do not require a showing of secondary mean-
mg to be validly registered and enforceable. 97 Examples of suggestive
marks include COPPERTONE for suntan lotion9s and HEARTWISE
for vegetable protein meat substitute foods.99
Arbitrary °° or fanciful 10 1 marks are those that have no mark/prod-
uct association whatsoever at conception.102 These marks are often re-
ferred to as "inherently distinctive" at least partially because they do not
require secondary meaning in order to be registered or enforced. 10 3
Trademarks that are inherently distinctive are protected without re-
gard to secondary meaning.1° 4 Trademarks that fall within the sugges-
tive or arbitrary or fanciful categories are inherently distinctive and
therefore need not possess secondary meaning.105 However, the owner of
a descriptive mark must establish secondary meaning or courts will deny
any recovery.10 6 The requirement that an otherwise descriptive mark
have secondary meaning to be enforceable or registrable is justified as a
facilitation of competition among producers. 0 7 Granting protection
from the moment of creation with no use established to even descrip-
96. MCCARTHY, supra note 94, § 11:21. See also Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903
F.2d 434, 443 (7th Cir. 1990); Union Nat'l Bank, 909 F.2d at 845.
97. MCCARTHY, supra note 94, § 11:20. See also Papercutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., 900 F.2d
558, 562 (2d Cir. 1990); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 992 (7th
Cir. 1989). A precise discussion of suggestiveness is beyond the scope of this Article. The difference
between descriptive and suggestive marks is often thought of as arbitrary. See, &g., David J.
Fletcher & Anthony L Kera, The Forty-Third Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 80 TRADEmARK REP. 591, 670 (1990).
98. Douglas Lab. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 347 U.S. 968
(1954).
99. Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
100. A mark is said to be arbitrary when it consists of a common word applied in an unfamiliar
way. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 n.12 (2d Cir. 1976).
101. Fanciful marks are those "invented solely for their use as trademarks." Id at 1 I.
102. See Coach House Restaurant, Inc. v. Coach & Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1559
(11th Cir. 1991); Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 982 (2d Cir. 1988).
103. Coach House Restaurant, 934 F.2d at 1559; Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking
Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1523 (1 Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 639 (1991); Blisscraft of Hollywood v.
United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The presumption that a fanciful word or
mark becomes distinctive and identifies the source of goods on which it its used immediately after
adoption and bona fide first use is basic in trademark law.") (citing 2 HARRY D. NIMS, UNFAiR
COMPETITION & TRADEMARKS § 346, at 1078 (4th ed. 1947)).
104. See Port, supra note 59, at 532-34.
105. See generally, CHtSUM & JAcOBS, supra note 46, at § 5C[3][a].
106. General Time Instruments Corp. v. United States Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854-55 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948); Black & Decker, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 632 F.
Supp. 185, 194 (D. Conn. 1986); American Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F.
Supp. 50, 51 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1958).
107. Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir.




tive-the weakest-trademarks would amount to an obstacle to competi-
tion among producers of that product. The holder of one descriptive
mark could block the entrance into a specific market by other competi-
tors by merely claiming trademark rights to the name or a descriptive
feature of the product.108
That is, the owner of a weak mark should not be able to protect or
enforce that mark against others until that owner's rights have become
clarified. Trademark rights in weak or descriptive marks become clari-
fied when the consumers of goods associate a trademark with a producer
of those goods. Unless the mark has secondary meaning, the mark is
merely a word that other market participants would presumably need to
adequately describe their products. Allowing trademark rights in a de-
scriptive mark without secondary meaning essentially would be granting
a monopoly on a word or words that competitors need to describe their
goods. 109
Finally, trademarks have a wide range of restrictions to which
neither patents nor copyrights are subjected. For example, trademarks
are not assignable without the pertinent goodwill associated with the
mark. An assignment in gross (transferring nothing but the mark itself)
is invalid.110 Also, the test for infringement-likelihood of confusion bf
relevant purchasers'I '-means that identical trademarks can be used on
similar products as long as the relevant consumers would not be likely to
be confused. Because of this restriction, many states have adopted anti-
dilution laws prohibiting identical marks from being used on unrelated
products (by definition a non-infringing act) in a manner that would be
likely to dilute the distinctiveness of the original mark. However, many
108. Twentieth Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1984) (terms
should not be monopolized by a single use). See also Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772
F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985) (there are a limited number of terms available to competitors to
describe their products and a single party should not be allowed to "snatch for themselves the riches
of the language and make it more difficult for new entrants to identify their own products"), cert
denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1044 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (descrip-
tive terms should remain unencumbered for use by all to associate such symbols with their goods).
109. See generally Timothy R.M. Bryant, Comment, Trademark Infringement The Irrelevance
of Evidence of Copying to Secondary Meaning, 83 Nw. U. L. Rv. 473 (1989); William F. Gaske,
Note, Trade Dress Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness as an Alternative to Secondary Meaning, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 1123 (1989); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo.
UJ. 287 (1988).
110. See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1925). By contrast, Japan,
for example, recognizes private property rights in the trademark itself. Therefore, assignments in
gross are valid totally divorced from any goodwill and trademark rights are severable and may be
assigned by class providing the goods of the remaining classification would not cause confusion with
the goods of the class assigned. See generally Kazuko Matsuo, Trademars in 4 DOING BusiNEss
IN JAP'AN (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1991).




courts now interpret the anti-dilution acts as applying only to "fa-
mous"1 11 2 marks even though no legislative history exists that indicates
that dilution should be applied so restrictively. 1 13
V. THE CONTRiBUTORS
Because most of the contributors to this Symposium come from
fields other than standard, doctrinal legal areas, we thought it would be
helpful for the reader if we took the unusual step of giving some personal
background of each individual before conventionally introducing each
contribution.
Lawrence Becker is a Professor of Philosophy at the College of Wil-
liam and Mary. Professor Becker is the author of the seminal work Prop-
erty Rights: Philosophic Foundations.114 In that book, Professor Becker
argues in favor of granting private property rights for social utilitarian
reasons: granting property rights to individuals serves the communal
needs.
Becker's contribution' I5 to this Symposium in a way is an extension
of the foundations laid in Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations. Here
Becker applies this analysis to intellectual property. Even though no one
else deserves property in someone's intellectual works, what is the basis
for the desert which results in a property right for the creator?
Becker raises three versions of the desert-for-labor theory as a justifi-
cation for the private property model of intellectual property: excellence,
reciprocal benefits, 1 6 and need. Becker is not satisfied with any of these
explanations. To Becker, none of these justifications adequately support
the award of property rights.
Even if they did, it is not entirely clear what sort of jurisprudence
would logically result. Becker recommends that because "what property
law ought to be follows from the desert arguments," other policy consid-
erations such as aggregate welfare have to be taken into consideration.
This should include the desert justification out of a simple "fundamental
112. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1033 (2d Cir.
1989).
113. See Port, supra note 59, at 519, 556-60.
114. Other selected works of Becker include the following: REclpntocrn' (1986) (positive reci-
procity is a virtue); ON JUSTIFYING MORAL ARGuMENTS (1973); Hard Choices Are Enough, 67 VA.
L. REv. 97 (1981); Rent Control Is Not A Taking, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1215 (1989); Impartiality and
Ethical Theory, 101 ETHics 698 (1991); Elements of Liberal Equality: Introduction to Kirp, Hoch-
schild, and Strauss, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 89 (1992); Places for Pluralism, 102 ETHIcS 707
(1992).
115. Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHL-KENT L. REv. 609
(1993).
116. This concept is derived from Becker's book RECIPROCrrY, supra note 114.
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fairness" approach. This would also require that we abandon the preclu-
sion of non-intellectual property owners and make the current owners
share their property rights in their intellectual creations.
Patrick Croskery is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech.). Croskery's
academic interest is to apply utilitarian political theory to diverse institu-
tions including government, the marketplace, and community.. Utilita-
rian political theory instructs that individual conduct will be guided by
principles of universal utility maximization.117
In his contribution,'" 8 Croskery applies an institutional utilitarian
perspective to intellectual property. Institutional utilitarianism is a study
of the impact institutions have on total utility.' 19 Croskery is concerned
primarily about the role government and the marketplace should play in
the production of intellectual property, the facilitation of access to intel-
lectual property, and the distribution of intellectual property.
Croskery's contribution creates a new framework by which intellec-
tual property can be analyzed. He breaks the provision of information
goods into four components as seen from the institutional utilitarian per-
spective. These four components consist of production, reward, fencing,
and fine-tuning.
Production is merely the question of who will produce information
goods. Reward is the question of assigning value to the information
goods produced. Fencing raises the issue of exclusion. Fine-tuning mod-
ifies whatever fencing has provided to achieve other goals.
Croskery concludes that both the government and the marketplace
(the institutions) can and should be the providers of the four functions
mentioned above. According to Croskery, the debate must be framed in
a manner which points out and highlights the advantages of the role of
the government and the marketplace in the definition of intellectual
property as private property and not a debate over which will prevail in
total victory over the other.
Timothy Brennan is Associate Professor of Policy Sciences and Eco-
nomics at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County and was previ-
ously an economist with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice. Brennan's prior work has focused on the philosophical bases
of economics. For example, Brennan expanded the economic analysis of
117. Louis M. Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary
Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1032 (1987).
118. Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENr L.
REv. 631 (1993).
119. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY WrrHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON (1988).
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antitrust law to the decision making actions of local governmental bod-
ies. 120 He has facilitated understanding of the economic impact and pur-
pose of antitrust laws through analysis of a concept known as "raising
rivals' costs. '1 21 Brennan has also contributed significantly to the under-
standing of determinants of market power through an economic
perspective.122
In his contribution,1 23 after a thorough analysis of the legal, eco-
nomic, and social objections to recognizing copyrights as property, Bren-
nan argues that so long as calling copyrights "property" does not imply
that use and exclusion restrictions are never permissible, Brennan would
not object to the private property model of copyrights. After all, to
Brennan, the real goal here should be a mutually agreeable and efficient
exchange-provide whatever incentive is necessary for the production of
copyrightable works of value. What a copyright is called is less impor-
tant than how the protected works are treated. Brennan believes that the
private property model of copyright law may be appropriate although he
is "uneasy" about it. His unease stems from his concerns over restricting
access to information and limiting uses of that information.
Robert Rotstein is a partner with the law firm of Rosenfeld, Meyer
& Susman in Beverly Hills, California. Rotstein focuses on litigation and
appellate copyright practice. Rotstein's contribution is grounded on his
perception of copyright law as viewed from a practitioner with over 17
years of experience. As literary criticism extends from and is a comment
on how literature is actually read and perceived, Rotstein's theory as de-
veloped in his contribution also extends from the reality of his copyright
practice. 124
In his contribution, 125 Rotstein argues that courts should look to
literary criticism in interpreting written, copyrighted works when mak-
120. Timothy J. Brennan, Local Government Action and Antitrust Policy: An Economic Analysis,
12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 405 (1984) (arguing that decisions of local governments are not efficient if
made outside of established democratic procedures and may warrant application of antitrust laws).
For a critique of this position and a good summary of Brennan's work, see Matthew L. Spitzer,
Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1301 n.41, 1321 (1988).
121. Timothy J. Brennan, Understanding "raising rivals' costs" 33 ANTrrgUST BULL 95 (1988).
122. Timothy J. Brennan, Mistaken Elasticities and Misleading Rules, 95 HARv. L. Rev. 1849
(1982).
123. Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REv.
675 (1993).
124. Rotstein, for example, has written amicus curie briefs in the following Supreme Court cases:
United States v. Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. 351 (1988); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (better known as "the Gay Olympics Case").
125. Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work,
68 CHI.-KrNT L. REv. 725 (1993).
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ing determinations of infringement. Rotstein argues that courts have not
hesitated to look to the most recent advances in science-and in some
instances feel an obligation to do so-in determining questions of patent-
ability. However, in copyright law, courts focus on copyrighted literary
works as autonomous objects as if they were possible of comparison one
against another in an objective manner. That is, Rotstein argues that
modem literary theory should also be taken into consideration when
courts analyze literary works just as they take modem theories of science
into consideration when analyzing patents.
Rather, Rotstein argues that courts should apply more literary the-
ory when examining copyrightable works. Contemporary literary theory
argues that no single interpretation bf a work is valid and that the inter-
action with the audience of the work is as much a part of the creation of
the work as putting pen to paper. Rotstein argues for an expansion of
protection of copyrighted literary works to include protection of these
various interpretations. In dealing with the. obvious idea/expression di-
chotomy problem raised by this argument-that is, in an effort to balance
the public's access to information with the need to reward and encourage
authorship, copyright law protects the tangible expression of ideas and
not the ideas themselves-Rotstein argues that texts should be ap-
proached as speech whose meanings take shape only in light of the code
(ideas) and convention (expression) in which they are formulated. Even-
tually, some conventions evoke only rote, stock reactions from audiences.
At that point, the code and the convention should be perceived as
merged; until then, however, the convention of the work should be
protected.
Jeremy Waldron is Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Pol-
icy Program in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley. In The Right to Private Property, 26 Waldron argues
that there are no right-based arguments that justify the huge disparities
in the distribution of wealth in our society. 127 While attempting to
breath new life into the concept of private rights, Waldron conducts-a
systematic critique of theories of property from Locke's Second Treatise
and Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Waldron finds that the mutually exclu-
sive split in the analysis of private rights between Locke's perspective of
rights (I own the right because of what I have done or what has hap-
pened to me) and Hegel's perspective of rights (private rights are things
126. JEREMY WALDROti, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). For a more thorough
review of this book, see Jeremy Paul, Can Rights Move Left?, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1622 (1990).
127. WALDRON, supra note 126, at 5.
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all men have such as free speech) runs contrary to his goal of distribution
of wealth based on rights. Rather, Waldron argues, these two perspec-
tives need to be worked into a single case to better inform the debate and
justifications for private property. 128
Waldron's contribution129 to this Symposium applies oppositional
analysis rather than sympathetic analysis to intellectual property.
Rather than approaching the matter from the viewpoint of those owning
and asserting intellectual property rights, Waldron approaches it from
the perspective of those feeling the impact of intellectual property rights.
Waldron believes that intellectual property is not self-justifying. In-
tellectual property must be justified not to the owners of the rights but
rather to those constrained by intellectual property. Intellectual prop-
erty acts to restrict the liberty of countless ordinary people on an individ-
ual basis. If this is to be legitimized, some conceptual justification must
be put forth.
One of the accepted purposes of the copyright system is to ensure an
equitable return on investment. Waldron argues, however, that nowhere
else does the American system of jurisprudence guarantee that investors
make a profit. Waldron's contribution, then, is a discussion of potential,
but to him not completely satisfying, justifications for putting intellectual
property on this conceptual podium as seen from the point of view of the
copier. He concludes that neither social utility nor individual rewards
justifies granting intellectual property rights to authors; that intellectual
property is a direct impingement on a copier's liberty; and that simple
post-modem deconstruction of the author also does not justify intellec-
tual property rights. Rather, Waldron argues for a more fully developed
explanation and justification for rewarding an author at the expense of a
copier if the intellectual property system is to have any internal concep-
tual integrity.
In his contribution, Waldron walks through a variety of philosophi-
cal justifications for restricting the copier. First he recognizes that intel-
lectual property, more than material property, is generally expressed
directly in terms of social utility. However, on closer analysis, social pol-
icy arguments tend to be converted into individualist arguments and fur-
128. The following is a sampling of more recent articles or books that Waldron either wrote or
edited: POVERTY AND FREEDoM (1991); THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTrCE IN BRITISH POLITICS
(1990);THEORIES OF RIGHTS (1984); Particular Values and Critical Morality, 77 CAL- L. REV. 561
(1989); Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality and Freedom, 62 S. CAL L. REV. 1097
(1989); Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1991); Hear We Go Again,
Punishing the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1990, § A, at 22.
129. Jeremy J. Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intel-
lectual Property, 68 CHi.-KsN L. REV. 841 (1993).
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ther confused by assimilation into rhetoric regarding material property
rights.
Waldron does not pose a specific way out of this problem. Rather,
he argues that if intellectual property is to be justified as private property
restricting the liberty of copiers, a better justification needs to be formu-
lated than merely: "I made it, so it's mine."
J.S.G. Boggs' contribution 130 is probably the most unusual and at
the same time valuable piece because of Boggs' unique position as an
artist somewhat at odds with the law. Boggs is not a scholar or teacher
in the traditional sense of the words. Depending upon one's perspective,
Boggs is either an artistic genius pressing hard the outer edges of creativ-
ity1 31 or, for example, in the minds of the United States Department of
Treasury, perhaps a counterfeiter.
1 32
Boggs' art is to draw "money." Boggs draws paper money in vari-
ous denominations in various countries. He then barters this money in
exchange for goods and services. He does this with the full knowledge of
those providing the goods and services that the "money" is "art" and not
money at all.
Boggs has been arrested in Britain and Australia for counterfeiting.
He was acquitted in both instances. 33 Unrelated to copyright law, ob-
serving how governments react to Boggs' art is a fascinating study of the
role of law itself. Governments seem to not want to encourage Boggs'
art. On the other hand, they are hard pressed to convince themselves
that Boggs should be punished or incarcerated for doing his art.
Boggs' contribution is a journey through the notion that copyright
law does not reflect an understanding or appreciation of the creative pro-
cess. If the purpose of copyright law is to promote creativity, it is espe-
cially ironic that copyright law does not show an understanding of
creativity.
Boggs pursues a theme questioning ownership of images. Although
some aspects of his comments may make it clear that he does not have
130. J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 CHL.-KENT L. REv. 889 (1993).
131. See Lawrence Weschler, Onward and Upward with the Arts" Value (Part 1: A Fool's Ques-
tions) (JS G. Boggs Draws Pictures of Legal Tender), THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 1988, at 33.
132. For a further description of Boggs' art and his problems with various law enforcement
agencies, see Roxanne Roberts, The Fine Art of Making Money: How Painter J.S. G. Boggs is Bucking
the System, WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 1991, at Fl; Wes Smith, Drawing Interest: Don't Take a Boggs
Bill At Face Value" Creativity Can Lend it Added Currency, Ca. TMin., Oct. 18, 1988, at Cl; Darcy
Frey, Dow Jones's Man About the Commonwealth, AM. LAW., Jan. 1988, at 143.
133. Catherine Dressier, Boggs' Bogus Bills Are Their Weight in Gold, CALGARY HERALD, Oct.
4, 1992, at C2.
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formal training in copyright law, his perspective is an important one and
sheds much light on the underlying need of copyright discourse.
Boggs argues that the underlying style of an artist's work is what is
most important to that artist and it is that and perhaps only that which is
worth protecting. Someone should be able to copy a work providing they
do not take the personal style of the artist. After all, the style of the
artist is really what artists value most. The copyright laws should recog-
nize and protect that which is most important to authors if the law's
intention is to provide an incentive so that authors will create more and
all of society will thereby benefit.
In conclusion, the editors of this Symposium would like to express
their gratitude to the contributors for their thoughtful excursions on a
fascinating journey. We would like to also thank the Commentators in
this issue, Russell Hardin, Keith Aoki, and Stephen Carter for their sig-
nificant contributions. We would also like to thank Jim Lindgren for the
original idea to do this Symposium in this format. Finally, we would like
to thank Mark K. Johnson and the editors and staff of Chicago-Kent
Law Review for their hard work and determination to see this project
through to completion.
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